Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), Article 2
Compiled by David Barth on September 14, 2008 from an article by Rick Atkinson, Washington Post Staff Writer and
Staff researcher Madonna Lebling.
Article 1: IEDs, The Electromagnetic Spectrum, and
MOASS
Article 2: Jammers
Article 3: Types of IEDs & Vehicles
Article 4: First Objective: Defeat the Device
Article 5: Second Objective: Train the Force
Article 6: Third Objective: Attack the Network
Article 7: The Story of Lt. Col. Gadson
Jammers - The Duke Jammer
Worse yet, there were problems with Duke, the sophisticated reactive jammer the Pentagon had decided would replace the
various models being used in Iraq. Syracuse Research Corp., a not-for-profit company created by Syracuse University in
1957, had won the competition for Duke using design concepts developed by Army engineers at Fort Monmouth, N.J. The
contract was signed in June 2005, with the first Duke -- a big box with a big antenna -- completed in November. But
deployment to Iraq was delayed to allow adjustments and more tests.
This state of affairs pleased no one, but it particularly displeased the Marine Corps. Marine casualties had been severe
in Anbar province, where high-powered radio-controlled IEDs were pernicious. Some Marine officers also feared that they
could be shortchanged as Dukes reached the field, that the Army was "taking all the good stuff," as one source put it.
"The issue got ugly with recriminations."
"It was part service rivalry, part delivery schedules, and partly that no one could make stuff fast enough," said Macy,
the rear admiral. "You can't walk into Circuit City and say, 'I want 25,000 high-powered jammers.' "
Chameleon Jammer
The Marines had already hedged their bets. Med-Eng Systems, a Canadian firm, made an active jammer that worked by
"blasting away, locking up everything," according to a retired Navy captain. As a foreign firm, Med-Eng needed a U.S.
partner to work on classified programs. Soon a corporate marriage was arranged with General Dynamics Armament and
Technical Products in Charlotte.
If inelegant, the jammer had showed promise in tests conducted in the summer of 2005. Because it could be reprogrammed
to meet changing insurgent threats, from key fobs to cellphones, the gadget was named Chameleon.
The Marines bought 1,000 Chameleons in November 2005. After encouraging tests at Johns Hopkins University Applied
Physics Laboratory and elsewhere, the Marines announced on Feb. 8, 2006, a $289 million contract that increased the
purchase to 4,000 Chameleons, which later
grew to 10,000.
General Dynamics threw its considerable heft into the project, even using a corporate jet as a delivery van to pick up
components nationwide, according to company sources. "Marines take care of their own," a General Dynamics talking point
advised, but the company also eyed a bigger prize. The first Dukes had deployed overseas in February 2006, yet the
jammers' difficulties in Iraq's electromagnetic environment persisted.
Noting an "Army requirement of 20,000 systems" worth $1.5 billion by 2008, General Dynamics intended to "pursue the
Army requirement and displace Syracuse Research," according to a defense industry document. A corporate information
campaign would promote Chameleon's virtues to Army and congressional leaders.
"We've pursued business opportunities," a General Dynamics spokesman said last week. "We were well aware of the Army
requirement." A spokesman for Syracuse Research declined to comment, citing "contract restrictions."
In Baghdad, confusion only intensified as hundreds and then thousands of new jammers flooded in, some active and others
reactive. Duke's shortcomings -- "it was looking like a turkey," the senior Pentagon official said -- grew so grievous
by late spring that officials considered scrapping the jammer altogether in favor of Chameleon.
Jammer Experts on The Ground
A naval officer, Capt. David J. "Fuzz" Harrison, had spent the winter of 2005-2006 in Baghdad trying to figure out
how to fix the jammer problem. "The ground electronic warfare fight that's killing so many soldiers and Marines would
be greatly aided by having people here who know electronic warfare," Harrison reported. That meant the Navy, which had
extensive experience in electronic combat and had recently been chosen to coordinate all of the military's CREW
systems.
Retired Gen. Montgomery C. Meigs, head of the Pentagon's counter-IED effort, returned from Baghdad in early February
2006 with similar conclusions. Expertise was needed in divisions, brigades, regiments and battalions. Harrison and Col.
Kevin D. Lutz, commander of Task Force Troy, the counter-IED brigade in Iraq, calculated that nearly 300 electronic
warfare officers would be required. The Navy agreed to provide them.
After brief training at Naval Air Station Whidbey Island in Washington state, the first batch of 33 Navy electronic
warfare experts -- including submarine, aviation, surface ship and engineer officers and sailors -- arrived in
Baghdad on April 15, 2006. Hundreds followed. Distributed throughout the force, they made an immediate
impact.
Now soldiers and Marines had an expert to adjust those finicky boxes and antennas, and to offer advice on using
jammers as a weapon against radio-controlled bombs. "It was," Meigs later said of the Navy's commitment, "a stroke
of genius."
By the summer of 2006, radio-triggered IEDs had dropped to less than half the total, and they would keep plummeting for
the next year. Duke became a valued battlefield asset in Iraq, and 2,300 eventually reached Afghanistan to begin
replacing the venerable Acorn, which had first arrived in 2003. The integration of active and reactive jammers in
both theaters proceeded apace. "Scar-tissue learning," as Meigs called the process, turned soldiers and Marines
into capable electronic warriors.
Article 3: Types of IEDs & Vehicles